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Hume and the Metaphysics of 
Agency
J o s H u A  M .  W o o d *
Was it not Matter of every  
Day’s Experience, the moving  
of the Hand by a meer Volition,  
would be as strange a Thing as an  
Apparition.
               —Robert Bragge (1725)1
1 .  i n t r o d u c t i o n
my topic is hume’s construal of the metaphysics of human agency. I take this to 
be distinct from, and ultimately to underlie, his discussions of free will and moral 
psychology. Therefore my concern in this paper, as I shall more often refer to it, is 
Hume’s “construal of the basic structure of human agency.” This construal includes 
two claims. The first holds that volition occurs independently of action. The second 
holds that, no matter how we look at it, the causal mechanism presumed to be 
operative in voluntary action remains incomprehensible. These two claims play 
a crucial role in a separate feature of Hume’s treatment of human agency. This 
is his “analysis of human agency,” or his assessment of what the basic structure of 
human agency means for our understanding of causation generally. of particular 
interest is his argument that, given the truth of the above two claims, we cannot 
draw the concept of causal power from a consideration of voluntary action. It is 
unfortunate that the details of Hume’s construal and analysis of human agency 
are neglected in the secondary literature. Not only are his remarks about human 
agency philosophically interesting, but they are deeply engaged with perspectives 
on agency in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
It has been said that Hume’s construal of human agency is “curious,” “philo-
sophically confused,” and “defective.”2 The suggestion is that Hume’s construal of 
* Joshua M. Wood is Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy at Amherst College.
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1 Bragge, A Brief Essay concerning the Soul of Man, 23.
2 Respectively: Connolly, “The Will as Impression,” 299; Keutner, “The Will as Wish,” 306; and 
stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 53. Moreover, Baldwin, in “objectivity, Causality, and Agency,” 
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the basic structure of human agency is simply untenable. At least one commentator, 
R. F. stalley, takes this view to reveal a problem that “goes to the heart of his whole 
system,” since, presumably, it is uniquely entailed by Hume’s empiricism.3 In this 
paper I argue that Hume’s construal of human agency is neither evidently implau-
sible nor indicative of a flaw in his empiricism. I begin (section 2) by presenting 
Hume’s growing concern to articulate his reasons for denying that reflection on 
voluntary action is the source of our understanding of causation generally. I appeal 
(section 3) to Hume’s analysis of interactions among external objects in order to 
clarify and distinguish the two arguments that are most important for his analysis 
of human agency. These are his “separability” and “incomprehensibility” argu-
ments. I then offer (section 4) a general explanation as to how Hume takes these 
arguments to corroborate his view that the concept of causal power is not derivable 
from human agency. Here my aim is to explain the philosophical burdens that 
emerge within the context of voluntary action and that are unevenly distributed 
between these two arguments. This will enable me to offer careful examinations 
of Hume’s separability (section 5) and incomprehensibility (section 6) arguments. 
In these examinations I draw from views of human agency in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century in order to demonstrate the philosophical merit and general 
acceptance of the construal of human agency advanced by Hume.
2 .  t h e  r e l e v a n t  t e x t s
The amount of space Hume devotes to his analysis of human agency changes 
considerably over time.4 In Book 1 of the Treatise (published in 1739) he rarely 
mentions human agency as a possible origin of the concept of causal power. This 
work is devoted almost exclusively to arguing that this concept cannot be drawn 
from a consideration of interactions among external objects. The Abstract (March 
of 1740) contains a few sentences on the potential relevance of human agency to 
our general understanding of causation. And the Appendix (october of the same 
year) offers a full paragraph. However, in the Enquiry (1748) we find a discussion 
that spans three and a half pages. Hume, it seems, takes an increasing interest in 
making explicit his reasons for rejecting human agency as a potential source of 
the concept of causal power.5
In the Treatise Hume takes for granted that what he has to say about interac-
tions among external objects carries over to the issue of voluntary action. The 
latter involves inward experience in the form of impressions of reflection. And 
suggests that “the account [Hume] offers of agency is not tenable” (114); Hornsby, in “Agency and 
Alienation,” that this account is “strange” (180); and Mumford and Anjum, in Getting Causes from Pow-
ers, that it is “implausible” (204).
3 stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 52.
4 A similar chronology is found in Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 25–28. The dates I provide 
here are the same as those provided in Norton and Norton’s detailed account of the genesis of the 
Treatise, Abstract, and Appendix in A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. 2: Editorial Material, 433–94.
5 several scholars have noted the difference between the Treatise and subsequent work by Hume 
on the topic of human agency in the Abstract, Appendix, and Enquiry. see Russell, Freedom and Moral 
Sentiment, 26–28; Blackburn, “Hume and Thick Connexions,” 112n14; and Millican, “Against the 
‘New Hume,’” 249n24.
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our experience of external objects is had outwardly in the form of impressions of 
sensation. Accordingly, Hume, in opening the Treatise’s discussion of causation, sets 
the issue of human agency aside in the following way: “[T]ho’ the ideas of cause 
and effect be deriv’d from the impressions of reflection as well as from those of 
sensation, yet for brevity’s sake, I commonly mention only the latter as the origin 
of these ideas” (T 1.3.2.16; sBN 78).6 But, Hume adds, “I desire that whatever I 
say of them may also extend to the former” (T 1.3.2.16; sBN 78). After this point 
in the Treatise we encounter only a few oblique references to human agency in 
connection with causal power.7 When Hume touches on human agency in the 
Abstract, he reminds us of the parallel he takes to hold between his analysis of 
external objects and his analysis of human agency: 
We have confined ourselves in this whole reasoning to the relation of cause and ef-
fect, as discovered in the motions and operations of matter. But the same reasoning 
extends to the operations of the mind. (T A25; sBN 655)
The relevant operations are, as Hume states, “the influence of the will in moving 
our body, or in governing our thought” (T A25; sBN 655). It is in the Abstract 
and Appendix that Hume begins to develop his analysis of human agency. How-
ever, it is not until the Enquiry that his analysis of human agency takes its most 
satisfactory form. 
Hume begins his treatment of causation in the Enquiry with a fairly concise 
argument for the claim that “external objects, as they appear to the senses, give 
us no idea of power or necessary connexion” (EHU 7.9; sBN 64). Then he enters 
into a lively and disproportionately long discussion of whether the concept of 
causal power is, as some of his contemporaries maintain, “an idea of reflection” 
stemming from a consideration of “the command which is exercised by will, both 
over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul” (EHU 7.9; sBN 64).8 What 
distinguishes his account in the Enquiry from his remarks in the Abstract and 
6 Hume’s works are cited in the body of the text in the following way. Citation of A Treatise of 
Human Nature (including the Appendix) is indicated by ‘T ’ and includes book, chapter, section, and 
paragraph numbers from the 2011 Norton and Norton edition followed by the corresponding page 
number, set off by ‘sBN,’ from the 1978 selby-Bigge edition revised by Nidditch. Hume’s “An Abstract 
of a Book Lately Published” is cited in a similar fashion but the letter ‘A’ is appended to the paragraph 
number from the 2011 Norton and Norton edition of the Treatise. Citation of An Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding is indicated by ‘EHU ’ and includes the section and paragraph numbers from 
the 2000 Beauchamp edition followed by the corresponding page number, set off by ‘sBN,’ from the 
1975 selby-Bigge edition revised by Nidditch.
7 I take his references to human agency to be implicit in his occasional remarks about spirit or inner 
experience. He states, most notably, that an experience of causal power is not discoverable among “the 
objects, which are presented to our senses, [nor those] which we are internally conscious of in our own 
minds” (T 1.3.14.10; sBN 160; my emphasis). We also find the following claims: that “no impression, 
either of sensation or reflection, implies any force of efficacy” (T 1.3.14.10; sBN 160; my emphasis); 
that a “single instance [of power]” is discoverable “neither in body nor spirit, neither in superior nor 
inferior natures” (T 1.3.14.10; sBN 160; my emphasis); and “The uniting principle among our internal 
perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects” (T 1.3.14.29; sBN 169; my emphasis).
8 I wish to delay discussion of whether Hume’s analysis of human agency is successful against 
thinkers who take it to be the case that voluntary action is the relevant origin of the concept of causal 
power. Locke and Berkeley are the two thinkers most often associated with this thesis. I submit that 
an adequate discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Appendix is not simply its length. We find in the Enquiry something like a justifi-
cation for that feature of Hume’s construal of human agency that philosophers 
have recently come to regard as highly controversial. This is Hume’s claim that 
volition and action are separable.
3 .  h u m e ’ s  a n a l y s i s  o f  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s
It will be helpful for our understanding of Hume’s analysis of human agency if we 
start with an overview of his analysis of interactions among external objects. It is 
primarily on the basis of his separability9 and incomprehensibility arguments that 
Hume denies that the concept of causal power can be drawn from any objects or 
objective relations presumed to exist in the world. Both arguments are designed 
to establish the conclusion that there is no necessary connection between two ob-
jects or events. What distinguishes these arguments is the way in which they reach 
this conclusion. Hume’s separability argument relies on the claim that an object 
can be conceived independently of another object. Hume’s incomprehensibility 
argument, by contrast, relies on the claim that the causal mechanism presumed to 
be operative in a given interaction is unintelligible or incomprehensible. Here I 
want to explain why Hume takes it to be the case that if either of these claims holds 
true for any given interaction between objects, then this interaction is incapable 
of serving as the origin of the concept of causal power.
3.1. The Separability Argument
Hume’s separability argument is intended to weaken the view that consideration 
of external objects could possibly yield the concept of causal power. And Hume in-
tends to weaken this view by demonstrating that causal power is not even implicated 
in interactions among them. For, presumably, we cannot draw this concept from 
an object that does not actually possess causal power. The separability argument 
assumes that the a priori relation of inseparability in thought serves as a criterion 
of objective causal relations between items in the world. According to this view, 
if two objects are separable in thought, then it follows that there is no objective 
causal relation between them.
Hume offers us an example of the collision of two billiard balls. When we see 
one billiard ball moving toward another, we typically expect that the motion of 
the first billiard ball will be communicated to the second. But in cases like this 
we can conceive
a clear and consistent idea of one body’s moving upon another, and of its rest imme-
diately upon the contact; or of its returning back in the same line, in which it came; 
or of its annihilation; or circular or elliptical motion: And in short, of an infinite num-
ber of other changes, which we may suppose it to undergo. (T 1.3.9.10; sBN 111)10
9 What I refer to as Hume’s ‘separability argument’ also goes by the name of the ‘no necessary 
connection argument.’ see Nadler, “The Medieval Roots of the occasionalist Roots of Hume.”
10 Compare Hume’s observation in the Enquiry: “[M]ay I not conceive, that a hundred different 
events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not 
the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these 
suppositions are consistent and conceivable” (EHU 4.10; sBN 29–30).
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According to the present assumption, if a necessary connection held objectively 
between the impulse of the first billiard ball and motion in the second, then we 
would not be able to conceive of alternative scenarios such as these. But since 
we can conceive these effects, we are committed to denying that causal power 
is metaphysically implicated in this interaction. If this holds for all interactions 
among external objects, as Hume thinks it does, then we cannot possibly draw the 
concept of causal power from a consideration of external objects.
The assumption underlying Hume’s separability argument is evident in the 
work of Nicolas Malebranche, who takes causal power to be operative only in those 
cases where two objects cannot be separated in thought. Malebranche writes in 
his Search after Truth (1674–75), “A true cause as I understand it is one such that 
the mind perceives a [logically] necessary connection between it and its effect.”11 
However, Malebranche is not alone in assuming as much. John sergeant, in his 
Method to Science (1696), says of causal relations that they involve “Natures being 
connected Naturally and, so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise.”12 
But he also takes what holds metaphysically of such relations to be mirrored in 
certain inferences conducted by the understanding:
[A] Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this, that the word [Cause] speaks the 
thing as it is in Nature, and [Reason] the same thing as ’tis in our understanding; and 
Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another, and, 
consequently, do Infer one another naturally.13
Hume takes it to be the case that inseparability in thought, as a criterion of the 
reality of causal power, fails to discover any causal relations existing among exter-
nal objects. This result would not have concerned Malebranche, since he himself 
reached this conclusion. Malebranche claims, for example, that “when a ball that 
is moved collides with and moves another, it communicates to it nothing of its 
own, for it does not itself have the force it communicates to it.”14 By contrast, that 
causation is not metaphysically implicated in interactions among external objects 
would have been an alarming consequence for a philosopher like sergeant. 
3.2. The Incomprehensibility Argument
Hume’s incomprehensibility argument poses a slightly different challenge. It does 
not aim to deny the existence of an objective causal relation by conceiving one 
object or event independently of another. Rather it is designed to establish the 
impossibility that empirical investigation or metaphysical insight discovers a rela-
tion capable of licensing an a priori inference. This is the conclusion, as Hume 
expresses it, that “the inference we draw from cause to effect, is not deriv’d . . . 
from such a penetration into their essences as may discover the dependance of 
11 Malebranche, Search, 450. With respect to this interpolation, see Nadler (“The Medieval Roots 
of the occasionalist Roots of Hume,” 454), who maintains that “Malebranche categorically identifies 
a causally necessary relation with a logically necessary one.” I share this reading of Malebranche. 
However, for an opposing view of Malebranche see Kail, “Hume, Malebranche and ‘Rationalism.’” 
12 sergeant, Method to Science, 277.
13 sergeant, Method to Science, 276; second and third brackets in original.
14 Malebranche, Search, 448.
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the one upon the other” (T 1.3.6.1; sBN 86). Hume offers the example of fire 
in the Enquiry: “We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but 
what is the connexion between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture 
or imagine” (EHU 7.8; sBN 64). 
Though the separability argument may be fundamental to Hume’s analysis 
of external objects, the incomprehensibility arguments speaks directly to those 
who assume that they are acquainted with the causal power operative in a given 
interaction or who at least take acquaintance of this sort to be possible. Hence we 
find Hume claiming that experience “never gives us any insight into the internal 
structure or operating principle of objects” (T 1.3.14.29; sBN 169); and that 
“we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies, as 
to perceive the principle, on which their mutual influence depends” (T 2.3.1.4; 
sBN 400). so I take the central claim of the incomprehensibility argument to be 
summed up by Hume’s denial that we can “conceive any connexion betwixt [two 
objects], or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united” 
(T 1.3.14.13; sBN 161). Conceiving as much, Hume states, would “amount to a 
demonstration, and wou’d imply the absolute impossibility for the one object 
not to follow, or be conceiv’d not to follow upon the other” (T 1.3.14.13; sBN 
161–62). Note that if a purportedly objective relationship is incomprehensible, 
then it follows that there is nothing discoverable in the objects themselves that 
might serve to ground an a priori connection between them. And if neither em-
pirical investigation nor metaphysical insight reveals a connection that is capable 
of licensing a deductive inference, as Hume thinks is the case for all interactions 
among external objects, then these methods of inquiry cannot possibly trace the 
concept of causal power to a consideration of objects.
If I am right about the distinction between Hume’s separability and incom-
prehensibility arguments, then he can employ these arguments independently 
of one another. I think this explains one of Hume’s criticisms of Malebranche in 
the Enquiry. Malebranche holds that our concept of causal power stems from a 
consideration of the divine will. This claim is based on his view that the requisite a 
priori connection holds only with respect to the relation between God’s will and an 
effect. As Malebranche writes, “[T]here is such a connection between His will and 
the motion of all bodies, that it is impossible to conceive that He wills a body to be 
moved and that this body not be moved.”15 Yet Hume offers the following criticism: 
We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which bodies operate on each other: 
Their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant 
of the manner or force by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either 
on itself or on body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? (EHU 
7.25; sBN 72)16
15 Malebranche, Search, 448; also: “[W]e see only His volitions to have an absolutely necessary and 
indispensable connection with natural effects” (684).
16 The present criticism expresses a concern that runs throughout Hume’s texts. In the Treatise 
Hume poses the following problem for drawing the concept of causal power from a consideration of 
God’s will: “’[T]is . . . impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the deity” (T 
1.3.14.10; sBN 160). In the Abstract Hume revisits the same problem: “What idea have we of energy or 
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This criticism does not take the form of conceiving a divine volition occurring 
independently of some effect. Rather Hume directs our attention to the incom-
prehensibility of the causal power Malebranche takes to be implicated in the 
operation of God’s will. If this relationship is incomprehensible, then how could 
it serve to render causation as such intelligible?
This is also Hume’s attempt to turn a particular line of argument, one that Mal-
ebranche himself advances, against the foundation of occasionalism. one reason 
Malebranche denies the existence of objective causal relations among material 
objects is because they are “incomprehensible.”17 As he explains,
There are many reasons preventing me from attributing to secondary or natural causes 
a force, a power, an efficacy to produce anything. But the principal one is that this 
opinion does not even seem conceivable to me. Whatever effort I make in order to 
understand it, I cannot find in me any idea representing to me what might be the 
force or the power [some philosophers] attribute to creatures.18
Malebranche tells a different story about the divine will. He reports that “whatever 
effort of mind I make, I can find force, efficacy, or power only in the will of the 
infinitely perfect Being.”19 However, the suggestion from Hume is that Malebranche 
is unable tell us any more about the causal power he takes to be implicated in 
divine volition than other philosophers are able to tell us about the causal power 
they take to be implicated in interactions among external objects. And this seems 
to be true. We find Malebranche making claims about divine volition that fail to 
explain the nature of the relationship between God’s will and events in the world. 
We are told, of course, that the “motor force” implicated in interactions among 
external objects “is nothing other than the will of God.”20 But about the power in 
question Malebranche can tell us little more than that: “His power is His will, and 
to communicate His power is to communicate the efficacy of His will.”21
The incomprehensibility argument that Hume brings against Malebranche 
is designed to highlight the assumption that is implicit in any attempt to derive 
the concept of causal power from a consideration of the divine will. The relevant 
assumption is that the power of God’s will is sufficiently comprehensible to serve 
as the origin of our understanding of causation generally. But this assumption is 
false. Hume concludes his criticism of Malebranche by pointing out that, with 
respect to both interactions among external objects and the implementation of 
God’s will, “We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other” 
(EHU 7.25; sBN 73). Given the terms of Hume’s incomprehensibility argument, 
it follows that a consideration of the divine will cannot possibly serve as the origin 
of the concept of causal power.
power even in the supreme Being?” (T A26; sBN 656). And, finally, in a footnote in the Appendix Hume 
speaks of an “imperfection that attends our ideas of the deity,” namely, an inability to “form a distinct 
idea of the force and energy of the supreme being” (T 1.3.14.12n30; sBN 633n1).
17 Malebranche, Search, 669.
18 Malebranche, Search, 658.
19 Malebranche, Search, 658.
20 Malebranche, Search, 448.
21 Malebranche, Search, 450.
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4 .  h u m e ’ s  a n a l y s i s  o f  h u m a n  a g e n c y
Having distinguished Hume’s separability and incomprehensibility arguments 
above, we are now in a better position to appreciate the contours of his analysis 
of human agency. It is on the basis of this analysis that Hume writes,
We may . . . conclude . . . without any temerity, though with assurance; that our idea 
of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within our-
selves, when we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use 
and office. (EHU 7.15; sBN 67)
Hume believes the same result holds for voluntary thought. on the way to this 
conclusion Hume identifies two basic components of human agency. These are 
volition and action. Apart from their disparate origins in sensation and reflection, 
Hume, generally speaking, does not take there to be a significant difference 
between the experience of interactions among external objects and the experi-
ence of voluntary action in ourselves. He lists “motives, volitions and actions” 
alongside properties of external objects such as “figure and motion” as candidates 
for constant conjunction (T 2.3.1.17; sBN 406–7). This means that, according 
to Hume, volition and action enter into purportedly causal relationships in the 
same way as interactions among external objects. The essential ingredients in 
both cases, at least insofar as Hume’s account of causal judgment is concerned, 
are constant conjunction and the customary association that develops on the basis 
of repeated experience. Hence Hume’s analysis of human agency, turning away 
from a consideration of objects in the world, brings the same arguments to bear 
on the relationship between volition and action in us.
The success of Hume’s separability argument in the case of human agency 
depends on the plausibility of either experiencing or conceiving volition apart 
from action. And the success of his incomprehensibility argument rests on the 
impossibility of either discovering or distinctly conceiving the causal relation 
presumed to hold between volition and action. Note that Hume, in constructing 
his incomprehensibility argument, has done well to put his opponent in the posi-
tion of needing to prove that we can distinctly conceive how the will works. Hume 
clearly has the upper hand here. But the separability argument does not have the 
same advantage built into it. In this case, Hume has put himself in the position of 
needing to prove that it is possible to conceive volition occurring independently 
of action. Therefore implicit in Hume’s separability argument is the burden of 
lending some measure of plausibility to this controversial feature of his construal 
of human agency. Here I want to focus on the status of this explanatory burden 
within the development of Hume’s analysis of human agency.
When Hume begins his analysis of human agency in the Abstract he does not 
provide an example in which the separability of volition and action is plainly pos-
sible. Rather he asserts, “When we consider our will or volition a priori, abstracting 
from experience, we are never able to infer any effect from it” (T A26; sBN 656). 
This claim presupposes that it is possible to conceive, or meaningfully “consider,” 
an instance of volition apart from a corresponding action. Hume, generally speak-
ing, takes this to be possible for “All those objects, of which we call the one cause 
and the other effect,” since he holds that these objects, “consider’d in themselves, 
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are . . . distinct and separate from each other” (T 2.3.1.16; sBN 405). Hume, as 
we have seen, has an explanation as to why we should take it to be true that sepa-
rability in thought holds for interactions among external objects. What Hume 
needs is an explanation as to why we should take this to hold in the case of human 
agency. In the Abstract we only find the assumption that volition and action are 
separable in this way.
When Hume writes about the separability of volition and action in the Ap-
pendix he does not bring this assumption to light. He claims that, in the case 
of human agency, “The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the 
cause” (T 1.3.14.12; sBN 632). And, rather than investigate this key assumption, 
Hume introduces in the Appendix a description that is congenial to the presumed 
separability of volition and action. Hume distinguishes between “the will being 
consider’d here as a cause” and its “effects,” namely, “[t]he motions of our body, 
and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind” (T 1.3.14.12; sBN 632). This ex-
plicit characterization of voluntary action as a relation between the distinct events 
of willing and acting recurs several times in the course of the Enquiry. Hume states 
of voluntary action generally that “[a]n act of volition produces motion in our 
limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination” (EHU 7.9; sBN 64). He writes of 
bodily movements in particular that “[t]he motion of our body follows upon the 
command of our will” (EHU 7.10; sBN 65); and, in the case of thought, that “[w]e 
only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to the command 
of the will” (EHU 7.17; sBN 68).
However, this is not all we find in the Enquiry. one of the most interesting 
passages in this text provides an example in which Hume thinks we can speak 
meaningfully of volition in the absence of action. This is Hume’s example of voli-
tion in the case of abrupt paralysis:
A man, suddenly struck with a palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly lost those 
members, frequently endeavours, at first, to move them, and employ them in their 
usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs, as a 
man in perfect health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains 
in its natural state and condition. (EHU 7.13; sBN 66)
Hume does not offer this example for the explicit purpose of buttressing the cen-
tral claim of his separability argument, but I think it captures his attitude toward 
the separability of volition and action. As I hope to show, this passage does not 
provide merely incidental support for Hume’s construal of human agency. Rather 
this passage implicitly demonstrates the plausibility that Hume takes to hold for 
the claim that volition and action are separable.22 
5 .  t h e  s e p a r a b i l i t y  o f  v o l i t i o n  a n d  a c t i o n
Hume’s separability argument has met with two criticisms. stalley suggests that 
the paralysis example is “clearly fictitious” and that Hume’s motive in construct-
22 My reading of this passage is stronger than the reading given by Pitson in Hume’s Philosophy of 
the Self. He writes, “This . . . case, incidentally, might be used to justify the claim that there are such 
things as volition, as distinct from bodily movements, though Hume himself appears simply to take 
the existence of volitions for granted” (133–34).
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ing this example is “theoretical rather than empirical.” 23 The implication is that 
Hume’s paralysis example is implausible and at best theoretically convenient. so 
I take stalley to express the criticism that is most often brought against Hume’s 
construal of human agency. This is the straightforward denial that Hume can speak 
meaningfully of an instance of willing in isolation from a corresponding act.24 
Furthermore, Thomas Keutner suggests that wishing “is the model for [Hume’s] 
account of willing.”25 The implication, in this case, is that the success of Hume’s 
separability argument depends on a fundamental misunderstanding of the will. 
something has clearly gone wrong within Hume’s construal of human agency if 
he holds that willing the movement of an arm is indistinguishable from wishing 
that a certain arm movement would occur. I respond to stalley’s criticism and 
others like it by drawing attention to the polemical context of Hume’s paralysis 
example as well as the historical precedent for examples of this kind. I believe 
this background will enable us to see more clearly the plausibility that Hume and 
others attribute to such cases. I respond to Keutner by offering what I think is a 
more persuasive reading of the passage that is essential for his criticism. 
5.1. Hume’s Criticism of Colliber and Mayne
one reason to think that Hume’s paralysis example is more than theoretically 
convenient is that this example bears directly on a peculiar position advanced 
in the eighteenth century. It was maintained by at least two of Hume’s contem-
poraries that we can attribute causal power to the will on introspective grounds 
alone. The internal evidence of the will’s power, according to this view, is available 
to us prior to acting and even without our ever having undertaken action. As it seems 
to me, Hume’s foremost concern in presenting the paralysis example is to argue 
against this particular version of the claim that introspection serves as a basis for 
attributing causal power to the will.
The paralytic in this example, as Hume writes, “is as much conscious of power 
to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health is conscious of power to ac-
tuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition” (EHU 7.13; 
sBN 66). Lest we take ourselves to be mistaken in judging volition to be indistin-
guishable in these cases, Hume posits that “consciousness never deceives” (EHU 
7.13; sBN 66). I do not take Hume to deny that there is some experience that 
might be referred to, perhaps misleadingly, as a “consciousness of power.” What I 
23 stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 48.
24 There are at least two versions of this particular criticism in the literature on Hume. Those who 
offer this criticism along Rylean lines deny either that we have any experience of willing or that we have 
an experience of willing such as Hume describes which might then be separated from action: Aune, 
Reason and Action, 50; Bricke, “Hume’s Volitions,” 86; stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 48–51; 
Bricke, Mind and Morality, 53; and Mumford and Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers, 204. Those who 
offer this criticism along Anscombean lines deny that human agency can be meaningfully conceived 
in terms of the distinct events of willing and acting: Anscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers, 107; 
Connolly, “The Will as Impression,” 276–77; stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 48–52; Baldwin, 
“objectivity, Causality, and Agency,” 114; and Mumford and Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers, 204–7. 
It will take considerable work to mitigate the force of these arguments. My concern in this paper is 
simply to establish that there is some merit to Hume’s claim that volition and action are separable.
25 Keutner, “The Will as Wish,” 307.
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take Hume to deny is that this experience confirms that the will is metaphysically 
endowed with causal power. If this experience did constitute a direct “conscious-
ness of power” in the will, then, presumably, it would arise only in cases in which 
the will is causally effective. But this “consciousness of power,” which fails to dis-
criminate between cases of effective and ineffective operations of the will, does 
not reliably track causal influence. “Consequently,” according to Hume, “neither 
in the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power” (EHU 7.13; 
sBN 66). The result of Hume’s paralysis example is that this “consciousness of 
power,” which does not constitute a legitimate acquaintance with causal power in 
the will, cannot possibly serve as a basis for the metaphysical claim that the will is 
endowed with causal power.
That introspection is helpful in this matter was suggested by samuel Colliber, 
who writes in his An Impartial Enquiry (1718),
I think I may appeal to any Considering Man whether he be not, in All ordinary 
Cases, sensible of an Ability of darting his Thoughts upon Any Particular object evn’ 
Antecedently to any deliberation.26
Colliber takes the will to be inherently endowed with causal power, and he takes 
this to be something of which “we are Conscious.”27 The same position is put forth 
in somewhat stronger terms by Charles Mayne in his Two Dissertations (1728). 
Mayne holds that “the Mind, before ever it exerts its Will or Power of Chusing, 
knows and is Conscious to it self, that it hath a Power of Choice and Preference.”28 
He acknowledges that this claim—“to know I have a Power of acting, before ever 
I have acted, or had any Tryal or Experience of it”—is “very strange and wonder-
ful.”29 However, he does not offer much in its defense.30 
The account from Mayne readily lends itself to the particulars of Hume’s pa-
ralysis example. Mayne claims,“’Tis utterly impossible . . . that self-consciousness 
should be deceived or imposed on.”31 Hume grants that this is true. Mayne also 
holds, remarkably, that “to lose a Power, without being sensible of the Loss . . . 
manifestly implies, that there never was any Consciousness or inward sense and 
Knowledge, either of the Power or the act.”32 Hume, I believe, grants the truth of 
this claim as well. so, in order to defeat Mayne’s position, all Hume needs to show 
26 Colliber, An Impartial Enquiry, 43.
27 Colliber, An Impartial Enquiry, 43.
28 Mayne, Two Dissertations, 156–57.
29 Mayne, Two Dissertations, 208.
30 Mayne’s defense amounts to this: “That the Mind, before ever it exerts its Will or Power of 
chusing, is conscious, and knows within itself, that it hath a Power of Choice and Preference [is] a 
necessary Condition of its Willing at all: Insomuch that, the very first time I had occasion to exert my 
Will, or make use of my Elective Power, I could not possibly exercise it, or do any voluntary Act, without 
knowing and being conscious to my self [before-hand] that I have such a Faculty or Power in my self” 
(Two Dissertations, 208; former brackets are my own). Mayne assumes that when we act voluntarily we 
exercise causal power. He then argues that we must know that we possess causal power on independent 
grounds because otherwise we could not come to exercise this power in voluntary action. However, 
Mayne does not consider the possibility that voluntary action is compatible with ignorance of this 
power or perhaps compatible with the absence of causal power in the will.
31 Mayne, Two Dissertations, 177.
32 Mayne, Two Dissertations, 201–2.
98 journal of the history of philosophy 52:1  January 2014
is that it is possible to be insensible to the loss of the will’s capacity for influence. 
And this is precisely what Hume intends his paralysis example to demonstrate. We 
learn that it is possible to have a “consciousness of power” even in a case in which 
volition is not accompanied by the intended movement. In light of Hume’s coun-
terexample, the inner experience to which Mayne appeals is unable to confirm 
the existence of causal power in the will.33 
of course, neither Colliber nor Mayne advance the philosophically ambitious 
claim that our concept of causal power is drawn from a consideration of the will. 
Nevertheless their singular defense of the basic claim that the will is endowed 
with causal power might suggest that it is possible to draw this concept from hu-
man agency. And, to remove this possibility, Hume argues for the intermediate 
conclusion that we lack purely introspective grounds for attributing causal power 
to the will. Yet, we might ask, is there any reason to think that Hume was familiar 
with the writings of Colliber and Mayne? I am not certain that he was. However, 
I find it is interesting that Edmund Law’s 1731 edition of William King’s Origin 
of Evil, a work with which Hume was likely familiar, cites both of these thinkers, 
suggests that they hold similar views on this specific topic, and provides excerpts 
from each of them in which they explicitly claim that causal power is directly 
introspectible in the will.34
5.2. Historical Precedent for Hume’s Paralysis Example
Another reason to think that Hume’s paralysis example is more than a convenient 
fiction is the historical precedent on which it capitalizes. There is more than one 
way in which Hume’s contention that volition and action are separable can be 
33 Craig, in “The Idea of Necessary Connexion,” offers what is, in my opinion, a puzzling reading 
of Hume’s paralysis example. Craig argues that the relevant concern of this example is an “epistemo-
logical one” (220). And to get this result Craig takes it upon himself to deny all of the following: (i) 
that Hume is concerned with the “formation of the idea of power” on the basis of a consideration of 
human agency; (ii) that Hume intends to address the “immediate contents of consciousness,” specifically 
as this concerns a direct consciousness of the will; (iii) that our reading of this passage should heed 
Hume’s “professed intentions”; and (iv) that Hume “realize[s] what he is up to” (220). Perhaps a full 
appreciation of Hume’s paralysis example requires us to spell out an epistemological concern with, 
as Craig puts it, “how we know or come to believe truths about causes” (217). However, I do not think 
this point hinges on denying all of the above. Moreover, the polemical context that I have provided 
for Hume’s paralysis example would seem to make such a sweeping denial unadvisable.
34 The full title of Mayne’s work is Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination with an Essay 
on Consciousness. Mayne’s discussion of the inherent and introspectible power of the will is restricted to 
his Essay on Consciousness. Hence Law, in his edition of King’s Origin of Evil, refers to Mayne in explana-
tory note 65 as “the Author of the Essay on Consciousness” (164). Here Law provides an excerpt from 
Mayne in which the relevant thesis is stated twice. (The passage is from Two Dissertations, 208.) Law 
himself introduces this excerpt from Mayne by claiming that we have no need of “an Experiment to 
assure us that we really have such a Power [in the will],” since, as he explains, “we are sufficiently con-
scious of it before any such trial” (164). Immediately after this excerpt Law, in lieu of quoting Mayne 
directly, reports that “The Author proceeds to shew, that this Fore-consciousness of a power of willing or 
choosing does most clearly demonstrate that the Mind in all its Volitions begins the Motion, or acteth 
from itself” (165). (This claim is lifted with slight abbreviation from Two Dissertations, 209.) Further-
more, in explanatory note 82, Law, referring to samuel Colliber as “S. C.,” provides an excerpt from 
Colliber’s Impartial Enquiry in which the relevant thesis is stated once. (The passage is from Impartial 
Enquiry, 42–43.) Finally, explanatory note 82 includes a footnote in which Law cites Colliber’s text, 
“Impartial Enquiry, &c. p. 42, 43,” and then adds, “see also an Essay on Consciousness, p. 205, &c” (213).
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traced to extant views about human agency in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. However, I will limit myself to a certain kind of precedent, namely, ex-
amples involving paralysis or injury that are similar to Hume’s own example. To 
begin, descartes writes in his Description of the Human Body (1664),
We can . . . observe that when some part of our body is harmed, for example when 
a nerve is irritated, the result is that the part in question ceases to obey our will as 
it normally does.35
What is interesting about this observation is the conclusion descartes draws from 
it. descartes holds that “without the requisite disposition of the organs” an action 
cannot be produced “no matter how much we may will this to happen.”36 The 
Ethics (1675) of Arnold Geulincx contains an example that, in several respects, is 
remarkably close to the one Hume uses in the Enquiry:
suppose . . . someone has retired to bed in the evening in the best of health. during 
the night, as he sleeps, a catarrh affects a nerve of his arm, which is thereby rendered 
paralysed. When he wakes up in the morning, not knowing what has happened, he 
immediately sets about getting dressed, and wants, as usual to pick up his shirt; but 
. . . his hand . . . lies limply on the bed. . . . This paralytic quite clearly feels, and is 
conscious that, when he wanted to pick up his shirt he was doing the same as at other 
times when he would indeed pick up his shirt.37
As Geulincx notes elsewhere, the point is that the person in this example
devotes himself to [an act] insofar as is, for his part, sufficient for motion to be made, 
and devotes all that he was wont to devote to it at other times, when upon his willing 
it motion was granted to his hand.38
Locke states in a letter to Philippus van Limborch (1708),
I readily recognize ineffective volition, as when a paralytic wills to move his palsied 
hand; I grant that that volition is ineffective and without result, but not that it is 
‘incomplete.’ For the act of willing is in this case just as complete as it was formerly 
when the hand complied with the volition.39
And Andrew Baxter remarks in his Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (1733),
[I]f the muscle, or muscles, designed to be the instruments in moving any joint, be 
cut transversly, or any other way disabled from their function, the will may command 
with all imaginable intenseness, yet will no motion of the joint ensue.40
What Baxter takes this to demonstrate is that “all on the part of the will [may be 
exerted] as at other times” when a healthy limb or joint responds normally.41
Each of these examples is intended to offer a case in which an instance of willing 
is unaccompanied by an act. For they each specify an instance in which volition 
in the event of paralysis or injury is either more apparent than in ordinary cases 
35 descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 315.
36 descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 315.
37 Geulincx, Ethics, 229 Annotation 13.
38 Geulincx, Ethics, 231 Annotation 16.
39 Locke, Correspondence, VII.404. This letter was published in 1708 as part of a collection entitled 
Some Familiar Letters between Mr Locke and his Friends.
40 Baxter, Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, 69.
41 Baxter, Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, 69.
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of voluntary action or just as apparent as in ordinary cases. Nevertheless we might 
wonder whether these examples stem from a tacit Cartesian assumption about how 
the mind relates to the body.42 If this assumption prevents someone from seeing 
the implausibility of volition occurring in the absence of an act, then the influ-
ence of this assumption might explain why various thinkers, including Hume, take 
such cases seriously. so it is worth noting that similar examples are to be found 
among thinkers who are either writing prior to descartes or take themselves to 
be influenced by Aristotle. For example, in his Physiologia (1567), Jean Fernel, a 
respected physician of the sixteenth century, writes 
[W]hen paralysis takes over the limbs, the nerves are deprived then of spirit and fac-
ulty, so that not even the most effective voluntas [or will] can bring about movement.43
And Kenelm digby, an Aristotelian natural philosopher and biologist, states in 
his Two Treatises (1644), 
[W]hen we are in health, our armes, and legges, and all our limbes, obey our will, 
reaching what we command them, and carrying us whither we desire . . . but if our 
sinewes be [altered]; well we may wish and strive, but all in vaine: for we shall not be 
able to make them performe their due functions.44
It seems to me that examples of this kind can be taken to have philosophical 
significance independently of whether a thinker subscribes to a Cartesian view of 
the relationship between mind and body. 
I do not want to suggest that all claims about the separability of volition and 
action in this period are carefully thought out. There are several instances in which 
the separability of volition and action is either assumed or merely asserted.45 It is 
important to emphasize that Hume, unlike the members of this group, does not 
avail himself of the bare assertion that volition is possible in the event of paralysis. 
Rather what we find in Hume is an example that is carefully designed to illustrate 
42 Hornsby, in “Agency and Alienation,” suggests that Hume’s “strange claims” about human agency 
might be explained by the fact that “Hume follows descartes in separating mind from brain” (177).
43 Fernel, Physiologia, 493; quoted with slight alteration.
44 digby, Two Treatises, 392–93. Admittedly, this gloss on digby is somewhat controversial, since, 
prior to writing the Two Treatises, he developed a personal relationship with descartes and was familiar 
with the Discourse on Method (1637).
45 For example, the assumption of separability can be found in William Wollaston, The Religion 
of Nature Delineated, 185; and Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion, 32. Malebranche is an interesting 
case. If Malebranche has an argument for the separability of volition and action, then it is not one 
that resembles Hume’s paralysis example. However, my view is contrary to the thesis, advanced by 
some commentators, that Malebranche plays a significant role in the development of Hume’s thought 
about the separability of volition and action. For example, McCracken, who takes Malebranche to be 
the relevant inspiration for Hume’s paralysis example, states in Malebranche and British Philosophy that 
“[b]oth thinkers remark that a paralytic may will that his arm rise but that the effect is not thereby 
produced” (260). This view is also found in Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy, 60; and 
Kail, “Hume, Malebranche and ‘Rationalism,’” 321. But Malebranche, so far as I can tell, never appeals 
to paralysis in an attempt to establish the separability of volition and action. Another commentator, 
Jolley, explains Malebranche’s position in “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality” as follows: “[I]t is 
not logically necessary that my arm should go up when I will to raise it; it is conceivable that I should 
be suddenly afflicted with paralysis” (229). As much as an example like this is both compatible with 
and supportive of the claim that volition and action are separable, I think it is misleading to suggest 
that Malebranche himself draws on paralysis for the purposes of justifying this claim.
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a case in which volition is uncoupled from action. Hume’s example concerns an 
abrupt onset of paralysis. And he asks us to think about what someone ignorant of 
this change would experience in the initial attempt to move her limb. This example 
is meant to tease out the intuition that we can speak meaningfully of someone 
willing to move a paralyzed limb in just the same way as when, a moment earlier, 
she successfully moved it.46 It does not seem implausible to claim that someone 
in such circumstances could have an experience of volition. 
I submit, in contrast to the view advanced by many commentators, that we lack 
sufficient reason to think that the separability of volition and action advocated 
by Hume is either obviously problematic or uniquely entailed by his empiricism. 
There is at least some merit to the claim itself. And Hume, as it seems to me, is 
not driven strictly by prior theoretical concerns to endorse this claim. Indeed, as 
we have seen, this claim is found in the work of several thinkers who do not share 
the tenets of Hume’s empiricism. Furthermore, it is because of the care with which 
Hume constructs his paralysis example that I believe he intends this to do the 
implicit work of justifying his construal of human agency in terms of the distinct 
events of willing and acting.47
5.3. Separability and the “Secret Wish”
Near the beginning of Hume’s analysis of human agency in the Enquiry we find 
the following claim:
Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or controul the planets 
in their orbit; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more 
beyond our comprehension. (EHU 7.11; sBN 65)
This passage serves as the basis of Keutner’s contention that, according to Hume, 
“volition is nothing but a wish.”48 He then attributes to Hume a failure to see the 
“epistemic difference between willing and wishing.”49 Presumably, it is this misun-
derstanding of the basic structure of human agency that leads Hume to claim that 
volition and action are separable. Hume, on this reading, mistakenly concludes 
from the fact that we can clearly conceive a wish in isolation from action that voli-
tion itself is separable from action. However, I find Keutner’s interpretation of 
46 Hume’s paralysis example is considerably more helpful in establishing this intuition than his 
earlier offhand remark in the Treatise : “A person, that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeav-
ours for a long time afterwards to serve himself with them” (T 1.3.9.18; sBN 117).
47 The success of Hume’s separability argument in its most comprehensive form depends on the 
possibility of conceiving volition existing apart from both bodily motion and thought. However, the 
latter is a possibility for which Hume does not explicitly argue. Malebranche had described mental 
agency in the Search after Truth in a way that is favorable to this task: “We know through inner sensa-
tion that we will to think about something, that we make an effort to do so, and that at the moment 
of our desire and effort, the idea of that thing is presented to our mind” (671). As we have seen, a 
similar description is found in the Enquiry: “We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, 
consequent to the command of the will” (EHU 7.17; sBN 68). Though Hume offers no suggestion as 
to how we might conceive volition apart from thought, this need not pose a significant problem for the 
comprehensiveness of his separability argument. Hume can appeal to the fact that we sometimes will to 
think of a word or the image of an object and yet fail to produce it; see schmidt, David Hume, 204n8.
48 Keutner, “The Will as Wish,” 307.
49 Keutner, “The Will as Wish,” 308.
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this passage to be highly doubtful. Hume neither models his concept of volition 
on wishing nor is there, lurking in this passage, an implicit failure to distinguish 
between wishing and willing. 
Hume’s remark about wishing is an unmistakable allusion to Joseph Glanvill. 
In his Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), Glanvill writes that the causal relation involved 
in human agency “will be as hard to apprehend, as that an empty wish should re-
move Mountains.”50 Hume was evidently taken with this analogy. And Hume, like 
his predecessor, is using this analogy to make a similar point about the incompre-
hensibility of the causal mechanism presumed to be operative in voluntary action. 
The relation between our will and ordinary voluntary acts is just as obscure to us 
as the relation between our will and events on which it clearly has no bearing. 
However, to fill out our reading of this passage we must take note of Hume’s 
additional suggestion that there is no a priori connection between volition and 
action. Hume observes that if it was the case that our will did move mountains or 
“controul the planets in their orbit,” then this would not be “extraordinary.” The 
reason, according to Hume, is that there is nothing about the will as such that 
entails its operation be restricted to our limbs and thoughts. Hume, then, would 
agree with the sentiment of another predecessor, Jeremiah seed, who writes the 
following in his Discourses (1745):
[T]he soul has no more a Power, independently of it’s [sic] Maker, to move it’s [sic] 
Limbs by a mere Thought; than it has a Power to move the sun, Moon, and stars by 
merely willing it: And He, who has made the former consequent upon our Volition, 
might have made the latter so too by his Almighty Power.51
Hume may not be alluding to this passage when he speaks of the possibility of 
influencing the “planets in their orbit.” But the remark from seed is helpful for 
the following reason. Hume would accept the suggestion that it just so happens 
that volition is ordinarily accompanied by the motion of our limbs and the altera-
tion of our thoughts. And Hume does not need to conflate wishing and willing 
to reach this conclusion. seed, who takes it that God has established the familiar 
relationship between our will and certain events, expresses the same view when he 
suggests that there is nothing about the will itself that prevents God from widen-
ing its scope of influence. According to Hume, if things were otherwise and we 
happened to discover in the course of life that our will “controulled the planets 
in their orbit,” then our attitude toward the basic structure of human agency 
would not be appreciably different. so far as Hume and seed are concerned, it 
is a merely contingent fact about the will that its operation is not conjoined with 
celestial events of this kind.
50 Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, 22. Popkin considers whether Glanvill’s work may have had 
an impact on Hume in “Joseph Glanvill: Precursor of david Hume.” He observes, “There are only a 
few scraps of evidence of any direct influence” (303). However, Popkin neglects to list the present 
passage among them.
51 seed, Discourses, 150–51.
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6 .  t h e  i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y  o f  v o l u n t a r y  a c t i o n
There are nine instances of Hume’s incomprehensibility argument in the Appen-
dix and Enquiry.52 I believe Hume makes extensive use of this argument because 
he takes it to be effective as well as fairly uncontroversial. But commentators have 
identified what seem to be two problematic claims in Hume’s incomprehensibil-
ity argument. Edward Craig takes this argument to employ a “gratuitously strong 
condition” for the possibility of discovering power in voluntary action.53 If Craig’s 
reading of this argument is correct, then, as I explain below, Hume is forced to 
embrace a conclusion about human agency he should want to avoid. Michael 
Ayers, objecting to a distinct premise, takes this argument to depend on “what 
might be called an extreme Lockean scepticism.”54 If Ayers is right, then Hume’s 
claim about the incomprehensibility of voluntary action can be traced to an 
unduly skeptical view of what can be known about human agency. However, the 
former objection depends on a misunderstanding of Hume’s argument. And the 
latter objection, as I hope to show, stems from a neglect of the historical context 
of Hume’s denial that we can comprehend the mechanics of voluntary action. 
Here too consideration of the relevant philosophical background will help us 
to appreciate the plausibility of Hume’s incomprehensibility claim as well as its 
independence from the tenets of empiricism.
6.1. Human Agency and its Obscurity
Hume holds that if causal power were discoverable in voluntary action in such a 
way that might serve as an origin of this concept, then it would be possible, as he 
sometimes puts it, to “perceive” or be “fully acquainted with” the causal connec-
tion involved (EHU 7.12; sBN 65). Here Hume’s concern is with the possibility of 
foreseeing an effect on the basis of our acquaintance with “any apparent energy 
or power in the cause, which . . . renders the one an infallible consequence of 
the other” (EHU 7.10; sBN 64–65).55 But Hume argues that the causal relation 
presumed to be operative in voluntary action is incomprehensible. According to 
Hume,
[T]he means, by which [voluntary action] is effected; the energy, by which the will 
performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being immediately 
conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry. (EHu 7.10; sBN 
64–65)
52 This may be why some commentators present Hume’s analysis of human agency exclusively in 
terms of this argument. see Kemp smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, 436–38; Ayer, Hume, 63–64; 
Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract, 195–97; Allison, Custom and Reason in Hume, 184–85; and Bell, 
“Hume on Causation,” 158–60.
53 Craig, “The Idea of Necessary Connexion,” 217.
54 Ayers, “Natures and Laws from descartes to Hume,” 107.
55 As strawson notes in The Secret Connexion, if “the knowledge of the power by which the mind 
operates” is to serve as an origin of the concept of causal power, then it “would have to involve a grasp 
of how it is that the causes produce the effects they do of a sort that would make a priori certain infer-
ences about such matters possible” (194).
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Therefore we cannot hope to derive the concept of causal power from empirical 
or metaphysical considerations of voluntary action.
Hume brings this argument to bear on three distinct features of human agency. 
The first concerns our general understanding of the relation between the will 
and voluntary action. Iterations of this type of argument refer to “natures” and 
“essences.” In the case of bodily motion, Hume writes that
if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will, we must know this 
power; we must know its connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union 
of soul and body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able 
to operate, in so many instances, upon the other. (EHU 7.11; sBN 65)
However, we do not know how the mind and body causally relate to one another. 
The same holds for how the will relates to thought: “[d]o we pretend to be ac-
quainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the 
aptitude of the one to produce the other?” (EHU 7.17; sBN 68).56
The second type of incomprehensibility argument descends to a consideration 
of the will’s scope of influence. For example, we cannot explain why we can move 
our “tongue and fingers” but not our “heart and liver” (EHU 7.12; sBN 65). Ac-
cording to Hume, if we were “fully acquainted with the power or force, by which 
[the will] operates,” then we “should also know, why its influence reaches precisely 
to such boundaries, and no farther” (EHU 7.12; sBN 65). We are equally ignorant 
of the will’s scope of influence in the case of mental operations. Hume notes that 
“our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our 
ideas,” and that “these limits are not known by reason, or any acquaintance with 
the nature of cause and effect” (EHU 7.18; sBN 68).57 A related mystery is that the 
will’s scope of influence over both bodily motion and mental operation is variable. 
He remarks that “[a] man in health possesses more of [voluntary control], than 
one languishing with sickness” and that “[w]e are more master of our thoughts in 
the morning than in the evening: Fasting, than after a full meal” (EHU 7.19; sBN 
68). Hume asks, “Is there not here, either in a spiritual or material substance, or 
both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which the effect depends, 
and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will 
equally unknown and incomprehensible?” (EHU 7.19; sBN 68–69).
The third type of incomprehensibility argument is narrower still. It focuses 
on our ignorance of how the will works even in those instances in which we take 
its influence to be clear. With respect to voluntary action in the form of thought, 
Hume observes,
We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to the com-
mand of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed; the power, 
by which it is produced; is entirely beyond our comprehension. (EHU 7.17; sBN 68)
56 Hume brought up the same argument in the Appendix: “so far from perceiving the connexion 
betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body; ’tis allow’d that no effect is more inexplicable 
from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more 
intelligible” (T 1.3.14.12; sBN 632).
57 Here Hume expands on a remark in the Appendix: “We have command over our mind to a 
certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it: And ’tis evidently impossible to fix any precise 
bounds to our authority, where we consult not experience” (T 1.3.14.12; sBN 632).
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And, finally, with regard to our ignorance of how willing to walk relates to the 
many anatomical changes that ensue when we do walk, Hume asks,
Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is 
performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or con-
sciousness, is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? (EHU 7.14; sBN 66)
When we will to walk we do not simply step forward. Rather we bring about count-
less minute bodily effects that we neither intend nor realize are taking place, but 
that together constitute walking. 
Hume’s emphasis on these puzzling aspects of voluntary action is intended to 
establish a conclusion that is relevant to philosophers. This is the conclusion that 
neither empirical investigation nor metaphysical insight is capable of “instructing 
us in the secret connexion,” which, in the case of human agency, “binds [volition 
and action] together, and renders them inseparable” (EHU 7.13; sBN 66). But 
Hume also intends his incomprehensibility argument to establish a conclusion that 
is relevant to a broader audience. Here he has in mind the “generality of mankind” 
who, according to Hume, “suppose [in ordinary instances of causation] that . . . 
they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with 
its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation” (EHU 7.21; sBN 69). Insofar 
as this view is held with respect to voluntary action, Hume’s incomprehensibility 
argument makes it readily apparent that it can be little more than an unreflective 
supposition. Therefore ordinary convictions about human agency are equally in-
capable of supporting the claim that the concept of causal power is derived from 
a consideration of voluntary action.
6.2. Intelligibility and the Discovery of Power
Hume’s incomprehensibility argument relies on an assumption about the con-
ditions of discovering power in voluntary action. There are several passages in 
which Hume spells out what he takes to be known when we “know a power” or 
“know its connexion with the effect” in such a way that could possibly constitute 
an origin of the concept of causal power (EHU 7.11; sBN 65). Hume claims, for 
example, that we “must know the secret union of soul and body, and the nature 
of both these substances” (EHU 7.11; sBN 65); “why [the will’s] influence reaches 
precisely to such boundaries, and no farther” (EHU 7.12; sBN 65); and “that very 
circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect” (EHU 7.17; 
sBN 67–68). Therefore it may seem as if Hume makes greater demands on our 
knowledge than is necessary for the discovery of an impression of power.
This has led to Craig’s suggestion that Hume “impos[es] a gratuitously strong 
condition” on the discovery of an impression of power in voluntary action.58 one 
reason to reject Hume’s stated condition, as Craig argues, is that it seems possible to 
discover an “impression of power” in everyday instances of voluntary action without 
thereby resolving the metaphysical “puzzle” of agency.59 Hence Craig claims that it is 
not clear why discovering an impression of power “would necessarily bring all these 
58 Craig, “The Idea of Necessary Connexion,” 217.
59 Craig, “The Idea of Necessary Connexion,” 216.
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[epistemic] benefits with it.”60 By an ‘impression of power’ Craig appears to mean 
either the familiar experience of exertion or ordinary attributions of causal power 
to ourselves. Neither is epistemically taxing. The experience of exertion arises 
without our being acquainted with the metaphysics of agency. And we evidently 
have grounds for attributing causal power to ourselves independently of whether 
we have discovered an intelligible connection that inherently binds volition and 
action. Therefore the problem to which Craig draws attention seems to be this. 
The condition stipulated within the incomprehensibility argument forces Hume 
to the undesirable conclusion that we, for lack of understanding the metaphysics 
of agency, either cannot experience exertion or have no grounds for attributing 
causal power to ourselves. What I take to be important about this criticism is that 
it brings out the potential conflict between Hume’s construal of human agency 
and our ordinary view of voluntary action.
However, a consequence of this sort arises for Hume only if it is true that his 
incomprehensibility argument is designed to test for the possibility of discovering 
an impression of power in either of the above senses. But we would be mistaken to 
frame his incomprehensibility argument in this way. Hume’s incomprehensibility 
argument is specifically designed to assess the possibility that our understanding 
of causation as a whole is drawn from a narrow consideration of voluntary action. 
The strength of his stated condition is appropriate to this task. It permits Hume 
to argue against the potential relevance of the experience of exertion, which he 
refers to as “nisus or strong endeavour,” on the following basis: 
This sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion 
with any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could not know it a priori. 
(EHU 7.15n13; sBN 67n1)
That the experience of exertion fails to ground an a priori inference does not 
commit Hume to the absurd view that we do not have this experience. But, given 
the terms of his argument, it does entail that our experience of exertion cannot 
possibly serve as the origin of the concept of causal power. Moreover, Hume’s ex-
tensive use of the incomprehensibility argument is not intended to demonstrate 
that we lack grounds for attributing causal power to ourselves. The constant con-
junction between volition and action is, at least according to Hume, sufficient to 
ground such attributions.61 Whatever may hold for empirical and metaphysical 
considerations of human agency, if Hume’s incomprehensibility argument has 
some consequence for everyday attributions of causal power to ourselves then I 
believe it is the following. The success of Hume’s incomprehensibility argument 
entails that it is not possible to trace our general understanding of causation to 
60 Craig, “The Idea of Necessary Connexion,” 216.
61 In “Natures and Laws from descartes to Hume,” Ayers writes the following of Hume’s posi-
tion: “our belief that our thoughts are having an effect on the world, our subjective sense of our own 
agency, is as much a result of custom and habit as any other causal belief” (107). I think Ayers is right 
about what Hume’s view must be with respect to the development of causal beliefs about voluntary 
action. But I am less confident about whether Hume is committed to explaining every feature of “our 
subjective sense of our own agency” in terms of the influence of custom. This complex issue will have 
to be addressed more fully elsewhere.
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voluntary action even despite the ordinary conviction, which Hume readily allows, 
that “we ourselves . . . are possessed of power” (EHU 7.9; sBN 64).
6.3. Historical Precedents for Hume’s Appeal to Incomprehensibility
If my presentation of the incomprehensibility argument is correct, then Hume 
incorporates an epistemic condition that is less problematic than it may seem. But 
the incomprehensibility argument still relies on what appears to be a remarkably 
skeptical view of our understanding of voluntary action. What I want to argue 
here is that, contrary to Ayers’s suggestion that this claim stems from “an extreme 
Lockean scepticism,” Hume’s appeal to the incomprehensibility of voluntary ac-
tion does not belie an unduly skeptical view.
Ayers’s mention of “Lockean scepticism” presumably refers to Locke’s claim 
that we cannot know the inherent nature, or real essence, of things. Locke writes 
in his Essay (1689): “[H]ow little ’tis of Being, and the things that are, that we 
are capable to know.”62 And Locke takes it to be the case, for example, that we 
do “not know the real Essence of a Peble, or a Fly, or of our own selves.”63 Given 
Locke’s broad epistemic curtailment, perhaps it should not surprise us to find 
several passages in which he himself claims that the inherent nature of voluntary 
action is incomprehensible. He remarks that, though the effects of the will are 
evident, “the manner [of its operation] hardly comes within our comprehension.”64 
Elsewhere Locke writes,
[T]he operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is ... unconceivable. How any thought 
should produce a motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our Ideas, as how 
any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is so, if Experience did 
not convince us, the Consideration of the Things themselves would never be able, 
in the least, to discover to us.65
I want to separate Locke’s reservations about our knowledge of real essences in 
general from his specific claim that the metaphysics of human agency is incom-
prehensible. For, whatever grounds Locke may have for the former, I do not 
think the latter contention, much less Hume’s purportedly “extreme” version 
of it, is skeptical in nature. This claim was commonplace among thinkers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. More importantly, however, is the fact that 
many instances of this claim are endorsed independently of skepticism about our 
understanding of human agency.
Apart from Locke, this claim was advanced vehemently by two of Hume’s pre-
decessors: Glanvill and Malebranche.66 But the view that the nature of voluntary 
62 Locke, Essay, Book IV, Chapter iii, section 29.
63 Locke, Essay, II.xxiii.35.
64 Locke, Essay, II.xxiii.28.
65 Locke, Essay, IV.iii.28; also: “[T]he communication of Motion by Thought, which we attribute 
to spirit, is as evident, as that by impulse, which we ascribe to Body. Constant Experience makes us 
sensible of both of these, though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For when the 
Mind would look beyond those original Ideas we have from sensation or Reflection, and penetrate into 
their Causes, and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness” 
(Essay, II.xxiii.28).
66 see Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, 21 and 24–26; Malebranche, Search, 449–50 and 669–71.
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action is incomprehensible held true for numerous other thinkers in this period. 
spinoza writes in his Ethics (1671) that “no one knows how, or by what means, the 
Mind moves the body.”67 This thought also worked its way into some unpublished 
notes Newton made on Query 31 of the Opticks: “We find in orselves a power of 
moving our bodies by or thoughts (but the laws of this power we do not know).”68 
(Alan Gabbey estimates that these notes were penned in 1705.) Hutcheson writes, 
in his Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1726), of the “mystery” 
that “the Act of Volition should move Flesh and Bones.”69 And Joseph Butler writes, 
in his Analogy of Religion (1740), that “we are greatly in the dark, upon what the 
Exercise of our living Powers depends.”70 one of the more colorful expressions of 
this claim is from François Fénelon who, in his Demonstration (1713), remarks that 
an agent “is an absolute stranger to what he has done in all the inward springs 
of his Machine.”71 
There are many other instances in which it is claimed, as a matter of course, 
that the causal relation operative in voluntary action is incomprehensible. It is 
particularly interesting that this claim was advanced by several thinkers who take 
the will to be obviously endowed with causal power. Richard Bentley claims, in his 
Eight Boyle Lectures (1692), that “we cannot conceive the matter of the soul’s Action 
and Passion; nor what Hold it can lay on the Body, when it voluntarily moves it: 
yet we are as certain, that it doth so, as of any . . . Infallible demonstratio[n].”72 
King claims, in his Origin of Evil (1702), that the will is endowed with causal power 
despite our ignorance of “the Modus” by which it operates.”73 We are ignorant, as 
King writes, of 
how the Members of the Body can be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the 
direction of the Will. Yet no body denys these things, because he knows not the man-
ner in which they are perform’d.74 
Finally, Jean-Pierre Crousaz, in his Art of Thinking (1724), attributes causal power to 
the will while denying that, in cases of voluntary action, he is in “any way sensible, 
how or in what manner I my self produce this Motion, or am the Cause of it.”75 
Hume’s incomprehensibility argument is able to capitalize on this particular 
view of human agency. For Hume does not want to draw the conclusion that we 
have no basis for claiming that the will is causally effective. Volition, as Hume 
recognizes, is accompanied by action frequently enough to justify a significantly 
67 spinoza, Collected Works, 495.
68 Gabbey supplies this quote from Newton in “Force and Inertia in seventeenth-Century dynam-
ics,” 13.
69 Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 272. Hutcheson also 
writes the following in the 1744 edition of his Metaphysicae Synopsis, “[A]lthough we are quite aware 
that we are doing something in changing our thoughts and desires and appetites, yet all the rest of 
our human efficacy is uncertain, even in the movement and control of our own bodies” (LMN 91). 
70 Butler, The Analogy of Religion, 22.
71 Fénelon, Demonstration, 118.
72 Bentley, Eight Boyle Lectures on Atheism, second Lecture, 31–32.
73 King, Origin of Evil, 190.
74 King, Origin of Evil, 190.
75 Crousaz, A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking, I.142.
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attenuated version of the claim that the will is a cause. This explains how, at least 
on Hume’s account of the formation of causal beliefs, it is possible to develop the 
ordinary conviction that our will is causally effective in voluntary action. But Hume 
does want to draw the intermediate conclusion that our basis for this conviction 
stems from neither empirical investigation of the will nor metaphysical insight into 
its operation. If Hume is right about this, then the conclusion his incomprehensi-
bility argument is ultimately designed to establish follows necessarily. We cannot 
hope to draw the concept of causal power from an acquaintance with the causal 
mechanism presumed to be operative in voluntary action. For this mechanism 
is thoroughly incomprehensible. What I believe we find by surveying the discus-
sion of human agency in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is that few 
thinkers in this period claimed to comprehend the inherent nature of voluntary 
action. This suggests that the view advanced by Hume and others is not skeptical 
in nature. Rather it is a view which is not only compatible with the existence of 
certain ordinarily beliefs about voluntary action, but which accurately reflects the 
impenetrability of the metaphysics of human agency. 
7 .  c o n c l u s i o n
Hume most likely did not take his claim about the separability of volition and 
action to be particularly novel. Even less remarkable, from Hume’s perspective, 
would have been his claim that the causal mechanism presumed to be operative 
in voluntary action is incomprehensible. This, I think, should caution us against a 
certain reading of Hume’s construal of the basic structure of human agency. For 
example, John Connolly attributes to Hume a “revolutionary view”76 and “a new 
concept [of will].”77 stalley claims that Hume’s view “differs radically from [the 
views] offered by most of his predecessors and contemporaries.”78 As it seems to 
me, this reading of Hume is historically inaccurate. If there is novelty in Hume’s 
account, I submit that it lies in his explanation of how we develop certain causal 
beliefs about voluntary action. For it is here that the principles of empiricism begin 
to shape Hume’s treatment of human agency. These principles do not themselves 
influence his construal of the basic structure of human agency.
Furthermore, Hume’s claims about separability and incomprehensibility are 
not as problematic as some scholars take them to be. His claim about separability, 
as I have argued, neither belies an obvious misunderstanding of the will nor is a 
claim that is uniquely entailed by his empiricism. Connolly traces the separability 
claim to Hume’s “epistemology and theory of meaning,”79 and stalley to what he 
refers to as the “constraints of Hume’s system.”80 The suggestion seems to be that 
only Hume, given his empiricism, could have been theoretically driven to endorse 
a claim of this kind. But Hume’s claim about the separability of volition and action 
is not strictly imposed on him by his empiricism. This claim, when regarded on its 
76 Connolly, “The Will as Impression,” 296.
77 Connolly, “The Will as Impression,” 301.
78 stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 42.
79 Connolly, “The Will as Impression,” 294.
80 stalley, “The Will in Hume’s Treatise,” 49.
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own, appears to have at least some philosophical merit. If this is the case, then this 
explains how it is that numerous thinkers during this period came to endorse the 
separability claim independently of adopting the principles of empiricism. A related 
criticism might be brought against Hume’s claim about the incomprehensibility 
of voluntary action. For this claim might be taken to stem from an unwarranted 
skepticism about our understanding of human agency. However, once this claim 
is regarded in the appropriate light, that is, as a claim directed solely at our un-
derstanding of the inherent nature of human agency, then it becomes apparent 
that it holds uncontroversially. And, far from being an outgrowth of skepticism, 
the incomprehensibility claim was endorsed by thinkers of every stripe. Hume, as 
it seems to me, integrates into his treatment of human agency two claims about 
the metaphysics of voluntary action that are both defensible and widely accepted 
at the time of his writing.81
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